A large number of web applications is based on a relational database together with a program, typically a script, that enables the user to interact with the database through embedded SQL queries and commands. In this paper, we introduce a method for formal automated verification of such systems which connects database theory to mainstream program analysis. We identify a fragment of SQL which captures the behavior of the queries in our case studies, is algorithmically decidable, and facilitates the construction of weakest preconditions. Thus, we can integrate the analysis of SQL queries into a program analysis tool chain. To this end, we implement a new decision procedure for the SQL fragment that we introduce. We demonstrate practical applicability of our results with three case studies, a web administrator, a simple firewall, and a conference management system. 
Introduction
Web applications are often written in a scripting language such as PHP and store their data in a relational database which they access using SQL queries and data-manipulating commands [36] . This combination facilitates fast development of web applications, which exploit the reliability and efficiency of the underlying database engine and use the flexibility of the script language to interact with the user. While the database engine is typically a mature software product with few if any severe errors, the script with the embedded SQL statements does not meet the same standards of quality. With a few exceptions (such as [15, 19] ) the systematic analysis of programs with embedded-SQL statements has been a blind spot in both the database and the computeraided verification community. The verification community has mostly studied the analysis of programs which fall into two classes: programs with (i) numeric variables and complex control structure, (ii) complex pointer structures and objects; however, the modeling of data and their relationships has not received the same attention. Research in the database community on the other hand has traditionally focused on correct design of databases rather than correct use of databases.
This paper lays the ground for an interdisciplinary methodology which extends the realm of program analysis to programs with embedded SQL. Since the seminal papers of Hoare, the first step for developing program analysis techniques is a precise mathematical framework for defining programming semantics and correctness. In this paper we develop a Hoare logic for a practically useful but simple fragment of SQL, called SmpSQL, and a simple scripting language, called SmpSL, which has access to SmpSQL statements. Specifically, we describe a decidable logic for formulating specifications and develop a weakest precondition calculus for SmpSL programs; thus our Hoare logic allows to automatically discharge verification conditions. When analyzing SmpSL programs, we treat SQL as a black box library whose semantics is given by database theory. Thus we achieve verification results relative to the correctness of the underlying database engine.
We recall from Codd's theorem [13] that the core of SQL is equivalent in expressive power to first-order logic FO. Thus, it follows from Trakhtenbrot's theorem [34] that it is undecidable whether an SQL query guarantees a given post condition. We have therefore chosen our SQL fragment SmpSQL such that it captures an interesting class of SQL commands, but corresponds to a decidable fragment of first-order logic, namely FO 2 BD , the restriction of first-order logic in which all variables aside from two range over fixed finite domains called bounded domains. The decidability of the finite satisfiability problem of FO 2 BD follows from that of FO 2 , the fragment of first-order logic which uses only two variables. Although the decidability of FO 2 was shown by Mortimer [29] and a complexity-wise tight decision procedure was later described by Grädel, Kolaitis and Vardi [21], we provide the first efficient implementation of finite satisfiability of FO 2 . We illustrate our methodology on the example of a simple web administration tool based on [22] . The PANDA web administrator is a simple public domain web administration tool written in PHP. We describe in Section 2 how the core mailing-list administration functionality falls into the scope of SmpSL. We formulate a specification consisting of a database invariant and pre-and postconditions. Our framework allows us to automatically check the correctness of such specifications using our own FO 2 BD reasoning tool.
Main contributions
1. We define SmpSQL, an SQL fragment which is contained in FO 2 BD . 2. We define a a simple imperative script language SmpSL with embedded SmpSQL statements. 3. We give a construction for weakest preconditions in FO 2 BD for SmpSL. 4. We implemented the weakest precondition computation for SmpSL. 5. We implemented a decision procedure for FO 2 BD . The procedure is based on the decidability and NEXPTIME completeness result for FO 2 by [21] , but we use a more involved algorithm which reduces the problem to a SAT solver and is optimized for performance.
We evaluate our methodology on three applications: a web administrator, a simple firewall, and a conference management system. We compared our tool with Z3 [14] , currently the most advanced general-purpose SMT solver with (limited) support for quantifiers. In general, our tool performs better than Z3 in several examples for checking the validity of verification conditions of SmpSL programs. However, our tool and Z3 have complementary advantages: Z3 does well for unsatisfiable instances while our tool performs better on satisfiable instances. We performed large experiments with custom-made blown up versions of the web administrator and the firewall examples, which suggest that our tool scales well. Moreover, we tested the scalability of our approach by comparing of our underlying FO 2 solver with three solvers on a set of benchmarks we assembled inspired by combinatorial problems. The solvers we tested against are Z3, the SMT solver CVC4 [3] , and the model checker Nitpick [7] . Our solver outperformed each of these solvers on some of the benchmarks.
Running Example
We introduce our approach on the example of a simple web service. The example is a translation from PHP with embedded SQL commands into SmpSL of code excerpts from the Panda web-administrator. The web service provides several services implemented in dedicated functions for subscribing a user to a newsletter, deleting a newsletter, making a user an admin of a newsletter, sending emails to all subscribed users of a newsletter, etc. We illustrate our verification methodology by exposing an error in the Panda web-administrator. The verification methodology we envision in this paper consists of (1) maintaining database invariants and (2) verifying a contract specification for each function of the web service. The database contains several tables including NS = NewsletterSubscription with attributes nwl, user, subscribed and code. The database is a structure whose universe is partitioned into three sets: dom U , bool B , and codes B . The attributes nwl and user range over the finite set dom U , the attribute subscribed ranges over bool B = {true, false}, and the attribute code ranges over the fixed finite set codes B . The superscripts in dom U , bool B , and codes B serve to indicate that the domain dom U is unbounded, while the Boolean domain and the domain of codes are bounded (i.e. of fixed finite size). When s = true, (n, u, s, c) ∈ NS signifies that the user u is subscribed to the newsletter n. The process of being (un)subscribed from/to a newsletter requires an intermediary confirmation step in which the confirm code c plays a role. Figure 1 provides the functions subscribe, unsubscribe, and confirm translated manually into SmpSL.
1 The comments in quotations // ". . ." originate from the PHP source code. The intended use of these functions is as follows: In order to subscribe a user u to a newsletter n, the function subscribe is called with inputs n and u (for example by a web interface operated by the newsletter admin or by the user). subscribe stores the tuple (n, u, false, new_code) in NS, where new_code is a confirmation code which does not occur in the database, and an email containing a confirmation URL is sent to the user u. Visiting the URL triggers a call to confirm with input new_code, which subscribes u to n by replacing the tuple (n, u, false, new_code) of NS to with (n, u, true, nil). For unsubscribe the process is similar, and crucially, unsubscribe uses the same confirm function. confirm decides whether to subscribe or unsubscribe according to whether n is currently subscribed to u. The CHOOSE command selects one row non-deterministically.
The database preserves the invariant
Inv says that the pair (n, u) of newsletter and user is a key of the relation NS. The subscripts of the quantifiers denote the domains over which the quantified variables range. In our verification methodology we add invariants as additional conjuncts to the pre-and postconditions of every function. In this way invariants strengthen the pre-conditions and can be used to prove the post-conditions of the functions. On the other hand, the post-conditions require to re-establish the validity of the invariants. execution of f, the condition post f ∧ Inv should be satisfied if pre f ∧ Inv was satisfied before executing f. pre subscribe and pre unsubscribe express that new_code is an unused non-nil code and that NS gh is equal to NS. NS gh is a ghost table, used in the post-conditions to relate the state before the execution of the function to the state after the execution. NS gh does not occur in the functions and is not modified. post subscribe and post unsubscribe express that NS is obtained from NS gh by inserting or updating a row satisfying user = u AND nwl = n whenever the exit command is not executed. The intended behavior of confirm depends on which function created cd. pre confirm introduces a Boolean ghost variable sub gh whose value is true (respectively false) if cd was generated as a new code in subscribe (respectively unsubscribe). sub gh does not occur in confirm. post confirm express that, when sub gh is true, NS is obtained from NS by toggling the value of the column subscribed from false to true in the NS gh row whose confirm code is cd; when sub gh is false, NS is obtained from NS gh by deleting the row with confirm code cd. Let us now describe the error which prevents confirm from satisfying its specification. Consider the following scenario. First, subscribe is called and then unsubscribe, both with the same input n and u. Two confirm codes are created: c s by subscribe and c u by unsubscribe. At this point, NS contains a single row for the newsletter n and user u namely (n, u, false, c u ). The user receives two confirmation emails containing the codes c s and c u . Clicking on the confirmation URL for c s (i.e. running confirm(c s )) has no effect since c s does not occur in the database. However, clicking on the confirmation URL for c s results in subscribing u to n. This is an error, since confirming a code created in unsubscribe should not lead to a subscription.
Our tool automatically checks whether the program satisfies its specification. If not, the programmer or verification engineer may try to refine the specification to adhere more closely to the intended behavior (e.g. by adding an invariant). In this case, the program is in fact incorrect, so no meaningful correct specification can be written for it.
In Section 3. 
Figure 2 Running Example: Pre-and post-conditions. g is either subscribe or unsubscribe. A simple way to correct the error in confirm is by adding sub gh as a second argument of confirm and replacing if (s1 = false) · · · with if (sub gh = false) · · · . Since s 1 is no longer used, the CHOOSE command can be deleted. The value of sub gh received by confirm is set correctly by subscribe and unsubscribe. With these changes, the error is fixed and confirm satisfies its specification. In the scenario from above, the call to confirm with c s and sub gh = true leaves the database unchanged, while the call to confirm with c u and sub gh = false deletes the row (n, u, false, c u ).
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Verification of SmpSL Programs
Here we introduce our programming language and our verification methodology. We introduce the SQL fragment SmpSQL in Section 3.1 and the scripting language SmpSL in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we explain the weakest precondition transformer of SmpSL, and we show how discharging verification conditions of FO A database instance I of a database schema R is a many-sorted structure with finite domains dom 0 ⊆ dom U and dom j = dom B j for 1 ≤ j ≤ s. We denote by sort I the function obtained from sort by setting sort I (att) = dom 0 whenever sort(att) = dom U .
The relation schema R = (relname, att 1 , . . . , att e ) is interpreted in I as a relation R I ⊆ sort I (att 1 ) × · · · × sort I (att e ). A row is a tuple in a relation R I . A database schema R is valid for SmpSQL if for all relation schemas R with attributes att 1 , . . . , att e in R, there are at most two attributes att j for which sort(att j ) = dom U . In the sequel we assume that all database schemas are valid. The SmpSQL commands will be allowed to use variables from SQLvars. We denote members of SQLvars by p, p 1 , etc.
Queries in SmpSQL
Given a relation schema R and attributes att 1 , . . . , att n of R, the syntax of SELECT is:
where p is a variable and 
Data-manipulating commands in SmpSQL
SmpSQL supports the three primitive commands INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE. Let R be a relation schema with attributes att 1 , . . . , att n . Let p, p 1 , . . . , p n be variables from SQLvars. The syntax of the primitive commands is:
The semantics of INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE is given in the natural way. We allow update commands which set several attributes simultaneously. We assume that the data manipulating commands are used in a domain-correctness fashion, i.e. INSERT and UPDATE may only assign values from sort(att k ) to any attribute att k .
The script language SmpSL
Data model of SmpSL
The data model of SmpSL extends that of SmpSQL with constant names and additional relation schemas. We assume a countably infinite set of constant names connames, which is disjoint from att, dom U , dom 
SmpSL programs
The syntax of SmpSL is given by
Every data-manipulating command C of SmpSQL is a SmpSL command. The semantics of C in SmpSL is the same as in SmpSQL, with the caveat that the variables receive their values from their interpretations (as constant names) in the state, and C is only legal if all the variables of C indeed appear in the state schema as constant names.
The command R = Select assigns the result of a SmpSQL query to a relation schema R ∈ R whose arity and attribute sorts match the select query. Executing the command in a state (I, const I ) sets R I to the relation selected by S, leaving the interpretation of all other names unchanged. The variables in the query receive their values from their interpretations in the state, and for the command to be legal, all variables in the query must appear in the state schema as constant names.
Given a relation schema R ∈ R with attributes att 1 , . . . , att n and a tupled = (d 1 , . . . , d n ) of constant names from const,d = CHOOSE R is a SmpSL command. If R I is empty, the command has no effect. If R I is not empty, executing this command sets (d
I n ) to the value of a non-deterministically selected row from R I .
The branching commands have the natural semantics. Two types of branching conditions cond are allowed: (R = empty) and (R != empty), which check whether R I is the empty set, and (c 1 = c 2 ) and (c 1 ! = c 2 ), which check whether c 
Verification of SmpSL programs
SQL and FO
It is well-established that a core part of SQL is captured by FO by Codd's classical theorem relating the expressive power of relational algebra to relational calculus. While SQL goes beyond FO in several aspects, such as aggregation, grouping, and arithmetic operations (see [27] ), these aspects are not allowed in SmpSQL. Hence, FO is especially suited for reasoning about SmpSQL and SmpSL.
The notions of state schema and state fit naturally in the syntax and semantics of FO. In the sequel, a vocabulary is a tuple of relation names and constant names. For a FO-formula ψ, we write voc(ψ) for the vocabulary consisting of the relation names and constant names in ψ. Every state schema R is a vocabulary. A state (I, const I ) interpreting a state schema 
Hoare verification of SmpSL programs and weakest precondition
Hoare logic is a standard program verification methodology [23] . Let P be a SmpSL program and let ϕ pre and ϕ post be FO-sentences. A Hoare triple is of the form {ϕ pre }P {ϕ post }. A Hoare triple is a contract relating the state before the program is run with the state afterward. The goal of the verification process is to prove that the contract is correct.
Our method of proving that a Hoare triple is valid reduces the problem to that of finite satisfiability of a FO-sentence. We compute the weakest precondition wp[[P ]]ϕ post of ϕ post with respect to the program P . The weakest precondition transformer was introduced in Dijkstra's classic paper [17] , c.f. [24] . Let A P denote the state after executing P on the initial state A. The main property of the weakest precondition is: We describe the computation of the weakest precondition inductively for SmpSQL and SmpSL. The weakest precondition for SmpSQL is given in Fig. 3 , and for SmpSL in Fig. 4 
. For SmpSQL conditions, [[·]]
R is a formula with n free first-order variables v 1 , . . . , v n for a conditional expression in the context of relation schema R of arity n. The notation ψ θ(α 1 , . . . , α n )/R(α 1 , . . . , α n )] indicates that any atomic sub-formula of ψ of the form R(α 1 , . . . , α n ) (for any α 1 , . . . , α n ) is replaced by θ(α 1 , . . . , α n ) (with the same α 1 , . . . , α n ). The formula θ(v 1 , . . . , v n ) has n free variables, and θ(α 1 , . . . , α n ) is obtained by 2 We deviate from [2] in the treatment of constants in that we do not assume that constant names are always interpreted as distinct members of dom U . This is so since several program variables or inputs can have the same value.
Figure 4 Rules for weakest precondition construction for SmpSL basic commands. The weakest precondition of if cond exit; s2 is the same as that of if !cond s2.
substituting each v i into α i . The α i may be variables or constant names.
The weakest precondition of a SmpSL program is obtained by applying the weakest precondition of its commands.
The specification logic FO
BD and decidability of verification
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, using the weakest precondition, the problem of verifying Hoare triples can be reduced to the problem of checking satisfiability of a FO-sentence by a finite structure. While this problem is not decidable in general by Trakhtenbrot Section 4 is devoted to our algorithm for FO 2 finite satisfiability. The main ingredient for this algorithm is the bounded model property, which guarantees that if an FO 2 (τ ) sentence φ over vocabulary τ is satisfiable by any τ -structure -finite or infinite -it is satisfiable by a finite τ -structure whose cardinality is bounded by a computable function of φ. The bound guaranteed in the first decidability proof of the finite satisfiability problem by Mortimer [29] was doubly exponential in the size of the formula. Later, Grädel, Kolaitis and Vardi [21] proved the exponential model property, from which we get that the problem is NEXPTIMEcomplete. The naive NEXPTIME algorithm arising from the exponential model property amounts to computing the exponential bound bnd(φ) from [21], non-deterministically guessing t ≤ bnd(φ) and a τ -structure A with universe {1, . . . , t}, checking whether A satisfies φ, and answering accordingly. Since the truth-value of FO-sentences is invariant to τ -isomorphisms, a τ -structure of cardinality at most bnd(φ) satisfies φ iff such a structure with universe {1, . . . , t}, t ≤ bnd(φ), satisfies φ. Appendix D.3 discusses a more refined version of the bound from [21].
Finite satisfiability using a SAT solver
Our algorithm for FO 2 finite satisfiability reduces the problem of finding a satisfying model of cardinality bounded by bnd to the satisfiability of a propositional Boolean formula in Conjunctive Normal Form CNF, which is then solved using a SAT solver. The bound in [21] is given for formulas in Scott Normal Form (SNF) only. We use a refinement of SNF we call Skolemized Scott Normal Form (SSNF). The CNF formula we generate encodes the semantics of the sentence ψ on a structure whose universe cardinality is bounded by bnd. An early precursor for the use of a SAT solver for finite satsifiability is [28] .
Skolemized Scott Normal Form
An FO 2 -sentence is in Skolemized Scott Normal Form if it is of the form The word Skolemized is used in reference to the standard Skolemization process of eliminating existential quantifiers by introducing fresh function names called Skolem functions. In our case, since function names are not allowed in our fragment, we introduce the relation names F i , to which we refer as Skolem relations. Moreover, we cannot eliminate the existential quantifiers entirely, but only simplify the formulas in their scope to the atoms F i (x, y). 4 The linear size of ψ uses our relation symbols have arity at most 2 to get rid of a log factor in [21].
The CNF formula
Given the sentence ψ in SSNF from Eq. (2) and a bound bnd(ψ), we build a CNF propositional Boolean formula C ψ which is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable. The formula C ψ will serve as the input to the SAT solver. First we construct a related CNF formula B ψ . The crucial property of B ψ is that it is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable by a model of cardinality exactly bnd(ψ).
It is convenient to assume ψ does not contain constants. If ψ did contain constants c, they could be replaced by unary relations U c of size 1. Being an unary relation of size 1 is definable in FO 2 . Any atom containing c cannot use both x and y, and hence the universe member interpreting c can be quantified: e.g. R(x, c) is replaced with ∃y U c (y) ∧ R(x, y). Let const(ψ) be the set of unary relations U c corresponding to constants.
We start by introducing the variables and clauses which guarantee that B ψ encodes a structure with the universe {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)}. Later, we will add clauses to guarantee that this structure satisfies ψ. For every unary relation name U in ψ and 1 ∈ {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)}, let v U, 1 be a propositional variable. For every binary relation name R in ψ and 1 , 2 ∈ {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)}, let v R, 1, 2 be a propositional variable. The variables v U, 1 and v R, 1, 2 encode the interpretations of the unary and binary relation names U and R in the straightforward way (defined precisely below). Let V ψ be the set of all variables v U, 1 and v R, 1, 2 .
Given an assignment S to the variables of V ψ we define the unique structure A S as follows:
. . , bnd(ψ)};
2. An unary relation name U is interpreted as the set { 1 ∈ A S | S(v U, 1 ) = T rue}; 3. A binary relation name R is interpreted as the set {( 1 , 2 ) ∈ A 2 S | S(v R, 1, 2 ) = T rue}; For every structure A with universe {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)}, there is S such that A = A S .
Before defining B ψ precisely we can already state the crucial property of B ψ :
Proposition 2. ψ is satisfiable by a structure with universe {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)} iff B ψ is satisfiable.
The formula B ψ is the conjunction of B eq , B ∀∃ , and B ∀∀ , described in the following.
The equality symbol. The equality symbol requires special attention. Let
B eq enforces that the equality symbol is interpreted correctly as the equality relation on universe elements.
The ∀∃-conjuncts. For every conjunct ∀x∃y F i (x, y) and 1 ≤ 1 ≤ bnd(ψ), let B 
For every truth-value assignment S to V ψ , A S satisfies
The ∀∀-conjunct. Let ∀x∀y α be the unique ∀∀-conjunct of ψ. For every 1
denote the propositional formula obtained from the quantifier-free FO 2 formula α by substituting every atom a with the corresponding propositional variable for 1 and 2 as follows: . Let
Appendix D.1 gives the construction of the CNF formula B ∀∀ according to the Tseitin transformation explicitly.
The construction of B ψ is finished and Proposition 2 holds. Note that [21] guarantees only that bnd(ψ) is an upper bound on the cardinality of a satisfying model. Therefore, we build a formula C ψ based on B ψ such that C ψ is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable by a structure of cardinality at most bnd(ψ). We leave the technical details of the construction of C ψ to the appendix. The algorithm for finite satisfiability of a FO 2 -sentence φ consists of computing the SSNF ψ of φ and returning the result of a satisfiability check using a SAT solver on C ψ . Both the number of variables and the number of clauses in C Uni(ψ) are quadratic in bnd(ψ).
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Experimental Results
Details of our tools
The verification condition generator described in Section 3.3.2 is implemented in Java, JFlex and CUP. It is employed to parse the schema, precondition and postcondition and the SmpSL programs. The tool checks that the pre and post conditions are specified in FO 2 and that the scheme is well defined. The SMT-LIB v2 [4] standard language is used as the output format of the verification condition generator. We compare the behavior of our FO 2 -solver with Z3 on the verification condition generator output. The validity of the verification condition can be checked by providing its negation to the SAT solver. If the SAT solver exhibits a satisfying assignment then that serves as counterexample for the correctness of the program. If no satisfying assignment exists, then the generated verification condition is valid, and therefore the program satisfies the assertions. The FO 2 -solver described in Section 4 is implemented in python and uses pyparsing to parse the SMT-LIB v2 [4] file. The FO 2 -solver assumes a FO 2 -sentence as input and uses Lingeling [5] SAT solver as a base Solver.
Example applications
We tried our approach with a few programs inspired by real-life applications. The first case study is a simplified version of the newsletter functionality included in the PANDA web administrator, that was already discussed and is shown in Fig. 1 . 5 The second is an excerpt from a firewall that updates a table of which device is allowed to send packets to which other device. See Appendix C for the code and specifications of the firewall. The third is a conference management system with a database of papers, and transactions to manage the review process: reviewers first bid on papers from the pool of submissions, with a policy that a users cannot bid for papers with which they are conflicted. The chair then assigns reviewers to papers by selecting a subset of the bids. At any time, users can ask to display the list of papers, with some details, but the system may hide some confidential information, in particular, users should not be able to see the status of papers before the program is made public. We show how our system detects an information flow bug in which the user might learn that some papers were accepted prematurely by examining the session assignments. This bug is based on a bug we observed in a real system. See Appendix B for the code and specifications of the conference management system. Each example comes with two specifications, one correct and the other incorrect.
The running time in seconds for all of our examples is reported in Table 1 . Timeout is set to 60 minutes and denoted as TO. If the solver reaches out of memory we mark it as OM. On the set of correct examples, both solvers answer within a few seconds, Z3 terminates within milliseconds, while FO 2 -solver takes a few seconds and times out on some of them. On the set of incorrect examples, Z3 fails to answer while our solver performs well. Note that correct examples correspond to unsatisfiable FO 2 -sentences, while incorrect examples correspond to satisfiable FO 2 -sentences.
Examining scalability
Inflated examples. In order to evaluate scalability to large examples we inflated our base examples. For instance, while the subscribe example from Table 1 consisted of the subscription of one new email to a mailing-list, Table 2 presents analogous examples in which multiple emails are subscribed to multiple mailing-lists. The column multiplier details the number of individual subscriptions in each example program. The unsubscribe and firewall example programs are inflated similarly (see Appendix C.1). We have tested both our FO 2 -solver and Z3 on large examples and the results reported in Table 2 . The high-level of the results is similar to the case of the small examples. On the incorrect examples set Z3 continues to fail mostly due to running out of memory, though it succeeds on the subscribe example. On the correct examples set Z3 continues to outperform the FO 2 -solver.
Artificial examples. In addition, we constructed a set of artificial benchmarks comprising of several families of FO 2 -sentences. Each family is parameterized by a number that controls the size of the sentences (roughly corresponding to the number of quantifiers in the sentence). These problems are inspired by combinatorial problems such as graph coloring and paths. We ran experiments using the FO 2 -solver and three publicly available solvers: Z3, CVC4 (which are SMT solvers), and Nitpick (a model checker). The results are collected in Table 3 . The artificial benchmarks are available at http://forsyte.at/wp-content/ uploads/artificial-smt2.tar.gz. Scalability of FO 2 -solver. We shall conclude that the FO 2 -solver, despite being a proof of concept in python with minimal optimizations, handles well incorrect specifications (satisfiable sentences) and also scales well on them. However it struggles on the correct specifications and does not scale well. This suggests that in future work we may choose to run both our solver and Z3 in parallel and answer according the first answer obtained. We also intend to explore how to improve the performance of our solver in the case of incorrect examples. By construction, whenever FO 2 -solver finds a satisfying model, its size is at most 4 times that of the minimal model. (The constant 4 can be decreased or increased. )
Discussion
Related work. Verification of database-centric software systems has received increasing attention in recent years [15] . Tools from program analysis and model-checking are used to reason about the correctness of programs which access a database. Unlike our approach, the services accessing the database are usually provided a priori in terms of a specification in the style of a local contract [30, 26] . The code of the services themselves may be automatically synthesized from the specification, cf. e.g. [19, 20, 15, 16 ]. The focus of verification then is on global temporal properties of the system assuming the local contracts. In contrast, out goal is to verify that the input code (written by a programmer rather than generated automatically) is correct with respect to a local specification. We discuss this also in Section 6. Several papers use variations of FO 2 to study verification of programs that manipulate relational information.
[8] presents a verification methodology based on FO 2 , a description logic and a separation logic for analyzing the shapes and content of in-memory data structures.
[32] develops a logic similar to FO 2 to reason about shapes of data structures. In both [8] and [32] , the focus is on analysis of shapes in dynamically-allocated memory, and databases are not studied. Furthermore, no tools based on these works are available. A description logic related to FO 2 was used in [9] to verify that graph databases preserve the satisfaction of constraints as they evolve. The focus of this work is on the correctness of the database, rather than the programs manipulating it. The verification method suggested was not implemented. In fact, to our knowledge no description logic solver implements reasoning tasks for the description logic counterpart of FO 2 studied in [9], not even solvers for expressive description logics such as SROIQ.
Verification of script programs with embedded queries has revolved around security, see [18] . However, it seems no other work has been done on such programs.
Conclusion and future work. We developed a verification methodology for script programs with access to a relational database via SQL. We isolated a simple but useful fragment SmpSQL of SQL and developed a simple script programming language SmpSL on top of it. We have shown that verifying the correctness of SmpSL programs with respect to specifications in FO 2 BD is decidable. We implemented a solver for the FO 2 finite satisfiability problem, and, based on it, a verification tool for SmpSL programs. Our experimental results are very promising and suggest that our approach has great potential to evolve into a mainstream method for the verification of script programs with embedded SQL statements.
While we believe that many of the SQL statements that appear in real-life programs fall into our fragment SmpSQL it is evident that future tools need to consider all of database usage in real-world programs. In future work, we will explore the extension of SmpSL and SmpSQL. Our next goal is to be able to verify large, real-life script programs such as Moodle [1], whose programming language and SQL statements use e.g. some arithmetic or simple inner joins. To do so, we will adapt our approach from the custom-made syntax of SmpSL to a fragment of PHP. We will both explore decidable logics extending FO 2 BD , and investigate verification techniques based on undecidable logics including the use of firstorder theorem provers such as Vampire [33, 25] and abstraction techniques which guarantee soundness but may result in spurious errors [12] . For dealing with queries with transitive closure, it is natural to consider fragments of Datalog [10] .
A natural extension is to consider global temporal specifications in addition to local contracts. Here the goal is to verify properties of the system which can be expressed in a temporal logic such as Linear Temporal Logic LTL [31, 11] . The approach surveyed in [15] , which explore global temporal specifications of services given in terms of local contracts, may be a good basis for studying global temporal specifications in our context.
Another research direction which emerges from the experiments in Section 5 is to explore how to improve the performance of our FO 2 solver on unsatisfiable inputs.
A PANDA web administrator
A.1 PANDA Source Code: confirm.php
We present the code of newsletters/confirm.php from PANDA Web Administrator version 1.0rc2 in Fig. 5 . The code was translated manually to the confirm function in Fig. 1 . The biggest difference between the PHP code and the SmpSL code is that the PHP code uses dbh->getRow to perform an SQL query which returns one row, whereas in SmpSL this is divided into two steps: first a SELECT query is executed and then CHOOSE selects one row. Additionally, the PHP code performs some more sanity checks, if (! $dbh -> query ( ' UPDATE newsletter_addresses SET subscribed = TRUE , confirm_code = NULL WHERE confirm_code = ? ' , array ( md5 ( $vcode )))){ print " Error while accessing database , contact system administrator . " ; die ; }; } else { // Else , code is to unsubscribe him , so do it if (! $dbh -> query ( ' DELETE FROM newsletter_addresses WHERE confirm_code = ? ' , array ( md5 ( $vcode )))){ print " Error while accessing database , contact system administrator . " ; die ; } } print " TRUE " ; ? > Figure 5 The code of confirm.php, on which confirm in Fig. 1 is based. 
A.2 Correcting the Error in Panda Source Code
In Section 2 we described a natural correction of the error in the running example. Under this correction, confirm − corrected satisfies the pre-and postconditions pre confirm and post confirm from Fig. 2 . sub gh is no longer a ghost variable. Now it is a second argument to confirm − corrected. The function subscribe, which had generated URLs calling confirm with one argument, namely the confirm code, now generates URLs with an additional argument true. Similarly, unsubscribe generates URLs with the additional argument false.
B The Conference Management Example
In this example we verify parts of a system for conference management which assigns reviewers to papers and records the reviews and acceptance/rejection decisions. We focus on the earlier parts of the reviewing process: First, potential reviewers (e.g. PC members) bid on papers to review. Based on the bids, reviewers are assigned to the papers (e.g. by the PC chair). An additional functionality of the system that we focus on is displaying the list of papers by a specific author.
B.1 The database
The database contains the following tables and columns: Papers with columns paperId, status, and session. The column status is over the bounded domain consisting of undecided, accepted, or rejected. The column session ranges over the bounded domain consisting of null,blank,invited,1,. . .,k;
PaperAuthor with columns userId and paperId;
ReviewerBids with columns userId and paperId;
ReviewerAssignments with columns userId and paperId;
Conflicts with columns userId and paperId. The columns userId and paperId range over the unbounded domain. The key of Papers is paperId.
The other tables have a many to many relationship between userId and paperId attesting respectively to the fact that the user is the author of the paper, the user has bid to review the paper, the user has been assigned to review the paper, or the user is in conflict with the paper (and therefore cannot review it). Before the bidding process begins, all papers are assigned the status undecided and the session invited (for an invited paper) or null (for a contributed submission). The session value blank comes up in the display function, and is at the root of a bug in the program.
B.2 The functions bid, assign, and display
The functions bid, assign, and display are referred to as conf-bid, conf-assign, and conf-display in Table 1 . The code of the functions bid, assign, and display can be found in Fig. 6 . The function bid registers that the user usr is willing to review the paper ppr with the sanity check that there is no conflict between the user and the paper. The table A is either empty whenever no conflict is found, or contains the single row ppr when there is a conflict. The function assign registers that the user usr is assigned to review the paper ppr. The function display receives as input the user id usr and returns the list of papers by usr that should be displayed. If the review phase of the conference is not yet completed (i.e. the Boolean argument stillReviewing has value true), display removes the session values of contributed papers from the output. This is done to prevent leaking the information that a contributed paper has been accepted (since only accepted papers have sessions) before the status of the paper has been announced. display leaves the status value invited visible.
We present two versions of display: one correct and one incorrect. display-incorrect leaves the session value null unchanged. Since null and blank are different values, the information leak which the program tries to avoid is still present. The correct version display-correct differs from display-incorrect by also replacing the status null by blank. This is done by expanding the WHERE condition of the UPDATE.
B.3 The specification
The database preserves two invariants:
These invariants state that no user may bid or be assigned to review a paper with which they are in conflict.
The specification of display is as follows:
This specification holds for display-correct and does not hold for display-incorrect.
For bid and assign we provide two specifications, one correct and one incorrect. The correct specification is as follows: In order to ensure that Inv2 is preserved by assign, we only allow a reviewer assignment to occur if there was a corresponding reviewer bid. Reviewer bids are required to avoid the conflicts by Inv1, and thus Inv2 is preserved. The incorrect specification for bid and assign is as follows:
It is obtained from the correct specification by omitting Inv1 from the preconditions.
C The Firewall Example
In this example we verify a simple firewall with respect to a simple invariant. The firewall is provided with a database consisting of two tables: Device and CanSend. The 
We want to verify that this invariant holds when the network topology is changed. We consider the function delete-device:
DELETE FROM CanSend WHERE senderId=deviceToDelete OR receiverId=deviceToDelete DELETE FROM Device WHERE deviceId=deviceToDelete Table 1 refers to delete-device in the rows labeled firewall. In this table, we experiment with two specifications. The incorrect specification is:
This specification is incorrect since it is possible that the only device which can receive messages from all other devices is exactly the device deviceToDelete removed by delete-device. Our correct specification is:
This correct specification ensures that there is a device as required which is not deviceToDelete.
C.1 Inflated examples
As a basic test of the scalability of our approach, in Section 5.3 we created large examples by inflating small examples. Here we illustrate this on the firewall example. The following is the result of inflating delete-device with multiplier 3. The function delete-device3 deletes three devices from the network: 
D.2 Axiomatizing models of at size at most bnd(ψ)
Here we continue the discussion postponed to the appendix in Section 4.2.2. Recall that by Proposition 2, B ψ is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable by a structure of cardinality exactly bnd(ψ). However, [21] guarantees only that bnd(ψ) is an upper bound on the cardinality of a satisfying model. In this appendix we explain how to construct C ψ so that it is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable by a structure of cardinality at most bnd(ψ) as follows.
We compute from ψ a new FO 2 -sentence Uni(ψ) in SSNF and set C ψ = B Uni(ψ) . Let Uni be a fresh unary relation name. Let Uni(ψ) be:
Fi(x, y) → Uni β i (x, y) ∧ Proposition 3. Let A be a voc(Uni(ψ))-structure. Let A Uni be the substructure of A whose universe is Uni A . We have A |= Uni(ψ) iff A Uni |= ψ.
D.3 An efficient finite satisfiability algorithm
The algorithm from Section 4.1 on which our algorithm in Section 4.2 is based was written from a theoretical point of view aiming to simplify the proof of the NEXPTIME-completeness of the finite satisfiability problem. In this section, we introduce several optimizations which, while not affecting the complexity of the problem, improve the performance of our satisfiability solver.
D.3.1 A refined upper bound
In the course of the proof of the bounded model property, [21] give a more refined version of the upper bound on the size of a minimal satisfying model. This more refine version leads to smaller upper bounds in many cases. To state the refined upper bound we need some definitions.
Definition 2.
(1-types and kings) 1. A 1-type t(x) is a maximally consistent set of atomic formulas and their negations which do not have y as a free variable.
2.
For a structure A and an element a of the universe of A, the 1-type of a in A is the unique 1-type t(x) such that A |= t(a). We say that a realizes t in A.
3.
Given a structure A and an element a of A, a is a king in A if there is no other element in A with the same 1-type as a. For example, for a vocabulary consisting of one binary relation name R and one constant name c, the following is a 1-type: Notice that this bound does not depend on whether the 1-types in the sum are realized in any structure. It is correct since (1) any 1-type which implies that x = c for any constant is necessarily a king and thus contributes m + 1, while (2) any other 1-type, which may or may not be a king, contributes at most max(m + 1, 3m) = 3m. We can now augment the algorithm in Section 4.2 to use the refined bound from Eq. (4). Our algorithm uses Proposition 1 to transform a FO 2 -sentence φ into Scott Normal Form, which adds a new relation name for every quantifier and every connective in φ. This comes at a heavy cost to performance, since the number of 1-types summed over in Eq. (4) is exponential in the number of relation and constant names in Scott Normal Form of φ. In this section we provide a more economic procedure for this purpose, which introduces new relation names only as a last resort.
Given a FO 2 -sentence φ, we construct a sentence ψ in Scott Normal Form such that φ and ψ are satisfiable by models of the same cardinalities. We construct a sequence of pairs (φ k , ψ k ), 1 ≤ k ≤ r as follows. The sequence is built according to the process described below. The length r of the sequence is determined by applying the process until no further steps can be applied. The sequence satisfies: -φ0 is the Negation Normal Form 6 of φ and ψ0 = ∀x∀y T rue, -φr = T rue and ψr = ψ, -ψ k is in Scott Normal Form for all 1 ≤ k ≤ r, and -the sets of cardinalities of the models of φ k ∧ ψ k are equal for all 1 ≤ k ≤ r. Given (φ k , ψ k ) we compute (φ k+1 , ψ k+1 ) iteratively as follows: 1. If φ k is in one of the forms: ∀xQy ∀x ∀yQx ∀y where is quantifier-free and Q is a quantifier, i.e. Q ∈ {∃, ∀}, then ψ k+1 is obtained from ψ k as follows. If Q = ∀, ψ k+1 is obtained by adding as a new conjunct inside the quantifiers ∀x∀y. If Q = ∃, ψ k+1 is obtained by adding a new conjunct ∀x∃y or ∀y∃x to ψ k . We set φ k+1 to True. We end the iteration by setting r to k + 1,
